INTRODUCTION
Several approaches to bounded rationality in repeated games have been considered so far. A first approach is concerned with the complexity of the Ž strategies used by the players Neyman, 1985; Rubinstein, 1986; Kalai and . Stanford, 1988 , and some authors suggest including complexity concerns Ž in the objective of the players Rubinstein, 1986; Abreu and Rubinstein, . 1988 . Another approach restricts the attention to strategies with bounded Ž . recall for example, Lehrer, 1988 , or combines complexity ideas with Ž . bounded recall ideas Kalai and Stanford, 1988 . Finally, some of the Ž . learning or the evolutionary game literature assumes that the players are Ž myopic even though they act in a long-run environment for example, . Jordan, 1991 . Ž . Jehiel 1995 considers an alternative approach to bounded rationalitý taking the view that when the horizon is too long individuals are unlikely to be able to correctly forecast the entire future. Individuals are assumed to form predictions about what will happen in a limited horizon future.
They subsequently make their decisions on the basis of their limited Ž . horizon forecast. Specifically, Jehiel 1995 considers two-player repeated alternate-move games with arbitrary finite action spaces A , i s 1, 2. Each i Ž . player i s 1, 2 repeatedly makes his choice of current action in A on the i basis of his limited n length-forecasts. 1 The limited forecast equilibrium is i Ž . referred to as n , n -solution and defined as a strategy profile such that 1 2
Ž .
1 players choose their actions so as to maximize the discounted average Ž . payoff over their horizon of foresight and 2 the limited horizon forecasts formed by the players are correct on and off the equilibrium path. It can Ž . be shown that there always exists at least one n , n -solution and that the 1 2 Ž . period t limited horizon forecasts of any n , n -solution repeat cyclically 1 2 as the time period t varies. The length of a cycle induced by any Ž . n ,n -solution can be bounded by K, where K depends on the lengths of 1 2 Ž foresight n and the cardinality of the action spaces A only see Jehiel, i i .
.
The objective of this paper is to provide a learning justification for the correctness of equilibrium forecasts on and off the equilibrium path. We Ž . follow Kalai and Lehrer 1993a in that the learning process takes place within the play of the game. Initially each player i has a belief over several possible forecasting rules, which are sequences of n -length forecasts one i for each period where this player must move. At each period the player Ž . who must move either 1 selects an action based on his belief so as to Ž . maximize the discounted average payoff over the next n periods or 2 i trembles with a small probability, and may choose any action with positive Ž . probability see Selten, 1975 . Player i subsequently observes the played actions in the past periods, gathers them into n -length streams of actions, i and compares the latter with the predictions associated with each of the possible forecasting rules, which in turn allows him to update his belief. Specifically, when the prediction of a forecasting rule does not coincide with the observation, then some tremble must have occurred to explain the observation with that forecasting rule. Such a forecasting rule becomes a little less plausible relative to those forecasting rules whose prediction fits with the observation. Besides, we assume that each player restricts himself Ž . Ž to a limited though arbitrarily large number of plausibility levels to be . defined below . Also, when the player cannot discriminate which forecasting rule is the most plausible one, we assume that with positive probability he may change his state of belief resulting in a possibly new most plausible forecasting rule. Finally, we assume that the supports of initial beliefs of the players are finite and contain all cyclical forecasting rules with a length of cycle less than or equal to K, which ensures that the forecasting rule of Ž . at least one n , n -solution is contained in the initial support of each 1 2 player.
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The main result of this paper is that, as the probability of trembling converges to zero, the players eventually play almost surely as in a Ž . n ,n -solution. In other words, the stochastically stable outcomes of the 1 2 Ž . process defined by the above learning story coincide with the n , n -1 2 solutions.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to justify a bounded rationality solution concept as a result of a two-player-learning process where the learning takes place during the play of the game. This Ž . should be contrasted, for example, with Binmore and Samuelson 1992 , Ž . who apply evolutionary ideas population learning to the finite automaton Ž framework and obtain results that differ from the solution concept pro-. posed by Rubinstein, 1986, and Abreu and Rubinstein, 1988 . Technically, the analysis borrows from the pioneering work of Foster Ž . and Young 1990 which was further developed and applied by Kandori Ž . Ž . Ž . et al. 1993 , Young 1993a , b , Fudenberg and Harris 1992 , Noldeke and Ž . Ž . Ž Samuelson 1993 , Kandori and Rob 1995 , and others see Kandori, 1996 , . for a survey . Those works were primarily applied to evolutionary contexts, and the noisy character of the process was interpreted as a probability of mutation rather than a probability of tremble. It turns out that similar techniques can be applied to our framework too. Intuitively, the stochastically stable outcomes correspond to the absorbing sets of the process without trembles which are hardest to destabilize, i.e., from which it is hardest to get out. In our framework, the absorbing sets of the process Ž . without trembles correspond to the self-confirming n , n -solutions, i.e., 1 2 strategy profiles such that the associated n -length forecasts are correct i Ž only on the equilibrium path see Levine, 1993, and Lehrer, 1993b , for a similar concept in a framework with perfect . Ž . rationality . We next observe that destabilizing a n , n -solution requires 1 2 several non-isolated trembles, whereas isolated trembles are enough to Ž . Ž Ž . destabilize a self-confirming n , n -solution that is not a n , n , solu-1 2 1 2 . tion . Since the former type of events is much more likely than the latter, it follows that, in the limit as the probability of trembling converges to zero, Ž . a n ,n -solution is eventually played with probability 1. In Section 2 the model is described. The solution concept is defined in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5, respectively, present and analyze the learning 2 It should be noted that in general there will be forecasting rules in the support of the players' belief such that the forecast at some period is inconsistent with the forecast at a later period. That is, the consistency attached to the infinite horizon of the game is not required at the individual level.
THE LIMITED FORECAST EQUILIBRIUM
Players are assumed to make limited predictions about the forthcoming moves after their own move. Player i only considers the forthcoming n i moves after his own move, and subsequently makes his choice of current Ž . action on the sole basis of his predictions. Jehiel 1995 introduces á solution concept along this line where the predictions made by the players may depend on the past N actions together with the currently played action and the time period. The dependence on the past N actions can be Ž shown to play no role as far as the set of solutions is concerned Jehiel, . Ž . 1995 , and the analysis of the learning process see below could trivially be extended to that case. For notational convenience, we will therefore assume that the limited predictions formed by player i depend only on the action to be currently chosen by this player and the time period. We now introduce some definitions and notation.
Definitions and Notation

Ž .
Ž . 1 A n -length pure prediction for player i is a stream of alternate i Ž . actions of length n starting with an action in A j/i . The set of i j Ž . n i r 2 n-length predictions is denoted by P , where 
Ž .
where a stands for the period t y 1 action of player j, j / i. j Throughout the paper we will consider generic values of the payoffs in the sense that for i s 1, 2 there is no
is a singleton, and a s
The second requirement is that players' equilibrium forecasts are related to equilibrium strategies by a consistency relationship, where consistency means that forecasts are correct on and off the equilibrium path, Ž . t Ž . i.e., for every h, a the period t forecast if player i chooses a , f a ,
coincides with the truncation to the first n actions of the continuation i w Ž < .x path induced by , Q .
h a n i i
h a n i i Ž . To summarize, a n , n -solution is a strategy profile that can be Ž . g⌺ is a n , n -solution if and only if there exists a forecasting rule 1 2
The forecasting rule profile f appearing in Definition 3 is uniquely defined given the strategy profile ; we say that f is associated with . Ž . Ž . The properties of n , n -solutions are analyzed in Jehiel 1995 . Iń 1 2 Ž . particular, it is shown that n , n -solutions always exist and can be 1 2 constructed backwards. Moreover, the forecasting rule f associated with a i Ž .
such that the latter property holds for the equilibrium forecasting rules of both players is referred to as the length of the cycle induced by the Ž . n ,n -solution. It can be shown that the length of the cycle of any 1 2 Ž . Ž . n ,n -solution is no greater than an upper bound K n , n which 1 2 1 2 Ž depends only on the lengths of foresight n and the cardinality of the i < <. 6 action spaces A . The consistency requirement introduced in Definition 2 assumes that forecasts are correct on and off the equilibrium path. For the analysis of the learning process it will be convenient to introduce an alternative Ž . Ž . weaker notion of consistency termed subjecti¨e consistency for which forecasts are correct on the equilibrium path but not necessarily off the Ž equilibrium path see Levine, 1993, and Lehrer, . 1993b . The weaker notion of consistency leads in turn to a weaker Ž . solution concept that we call self-confirming n , n -solution. Formally,
consistent with g ⌺ if, for every period t where player i must move, This path is uniquely defined because of the genericity assumption.
LEARNING AND LIMITED FORECASTING
The objective of this paper is to provide a justification for why forecasts should be correct as a result of learning. The basic view is that each player i restricts his endeavor to trying to understand what the forthcoming n i moves will be as a function of his current action. To this end, he forms a belief over forecasting rules where forecasting rules specify how to make n -length predictions in the dynamic environment of the game. At each i Ž . period the player who must move either 1 selects an action based on his Ž . belief or 2 trembles, i.e., makes a mistake. The mistakes occur with a small probability, and the player may then choose any action with positive probability. When he does not tremble, player i selects an action which maximizes the discounted average payoff over the next n periods accordi Ž . ing to his belief. The selection is typically based on that or those forecasting rule which is currently the most plausible one. Player i subsequently observes the played actions in the past periods. As soon as a new n -length prediction can be compared with a realized stream of actions, i player i asks himself, for each possible forecasting rule f he may consider, i whether the prediction associated with f is compatible with the observai tion or whether some mistake is required to explain the observation with f .
8 A forecasting rule whose prediction does not fit with the observation i becomes a little less plausible relative to a forecasting rule whose prediction fits with the observation. Also, each player i is assumed to restrict Ž . himself to a finite number of plausibility levels to be defined below , and when there are several forecasting rules that are candidates for being the most plausible one, the player may change his state of belief with positive probability resulting in a possibly new most plausible forecasting rule.
The main result of the paper is that provided the support of the players' initial belief is finite and contains all forecasting rules which have a cycle Ž .Ž of length no greater than K, where K ) K n , n so that the forecasting 1 2 Ž . rules of n , n -solutions belong to the supports of initial beliefs, see the 1 2 . end of Section 3 , we are sure that, as the probability of making a mistake Ž . goes to zero, a n , n -solution is eventually played with probability 1. Before we describe the learning process, we wish to point out that the above learning story does not require a great sophistication on the part of the players. First, even though the set of all forecasting rules is quite large, the support of player i's initial belief is not required to contain infinitely many of these.
9 Specifically, it is required to be finite and contain all cyclical forecasting rules of length no greater than K. The finiteness of the 8 Ž The underlying idea is that when player i looks at the previously played actions including . his own actions he does not know whether those result from trembling or not.
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Ž . This should be contrasted with Kalai and Lehrer 1993a , who cannot a priori assume the Ž . initial supports of the players to be finite; see also Nachbar 1997 . support of player i's belief seems a desirable assumption given that a boundedly rational player may not be able to keep track of the plausibility of infinitely many forecasting rules. Also, because cyclical forecasting rules of length no greater than K have a simple structure, they are more likely to be considered in the support of belief of the players. Ž Second, it should be noted that some forecasting rules including cyclical . ones are such that the n -length forecast of one period is not consistent i with that of a future period.
10 Each player i is allowed to assign positive weight to such forecasting rules which are dynamically inconsistent, and therefore we impose no restriction on the dynamic consistency of the forecasting rules to be considered by the players. It turns out, however, that inconsistent forecasting rules will eventually appear to be less plausible as a result of learning because they are less compatible with the observations. Further comments about the learning process will be presented in Section 6.
The Learning Process The Mistakes
At each period where he must move, player i may tremble with probabil-Ž . ity where should be thought of as being small . The trembles at each Ž period are independent from each other and stationary i.e., independent . of the history of plays . When he trembles, player i may choose any action Ž . a g A with a positive probability assumed to be independent of . For
example, each action a g A may then be played with the same probabili i < < ity 1r A . It should be pointed out, however, that the choice of a specific i distribution is immaterial for the asymptotic results to be described below as long as every action is played with a strictly positive probability.
State of Belief and Forecasting Rules
Each player i has a belief over a finite support of forecasting rules denoted by F , where F is assumed to include the set of all cyclical i i Ž .Ž forecasting rules with a cycle length no greater than K, K ) K n , n see 1 2
. above . For simplicity, we will present the argument for the case where the support F consists only of cyclical forecasting rules, i.e., ᭙ f g F , ᭚k, s.t. 
Xtq3 tq4 tq5
For example, if n s 3, f a sa a a and f a sa a a with
j j plausibility of every forecasting rule f g F based on past observations. 
of belief s is derived from the function s defined by
t it adds one increment if the prediction is incorrect . Ž . Ž .
the plausibility level of other forecasting rules being updated accordingly, . actions in Q .
Ž
. In the following analysis, it will be convenient to gather self-confirming Ž . n ,n -solution states which have the same states of belief for players 1 1 2 Ž . and 2 but which may differ in their streams of Max n , n q 2 actions are not in ‫ޅ‬ is denoted ‫.ޓ‬
Absorbing Sets without Trembles
Ž We first study the learning dynamics in the absence of trembles i.e., . s 0 . The learning process defines a Markov process, and we are interested in the stationary distributions of this Markov process. A set of states is absorbing if it is a minimal set of states with the property that the Markov process can lead into this set but not out of it. An absorbing set may a priori contain only a single state in which case it is a stationary state of the Markov process or it may contain more than one state in which case the Markov process cycles between states in the absorbing set. It is readily Ž . verified that starting from a state in a self-confirming n , n -solution 1 2 cluster, the system never leaves that set because the played actions can Ž . only confirm the belief in the self-confirming n , n -solution forecasting 
Stochastically Stable Sets
We now proceed to analyze how the dynamics of the learning process is affected by the presence of rare trembles. For every ) 0, we first note that the learning process defines an aperiodic dynamics because it is always possible to move from one state to another with an appropriate Ž number of mistakes and appropriate realizations of the random device in . the updating process . From the theory of Markov processes, that property Ž . ensures that 1 the learning process has a unique stationary distribution, Ž . 2 the proportions of states reached along any sample path approach this Ž . distribution almost surely, and 3 the distribution of states at time t approaches this distribution as t gets large.
We thus obtain a unique stationary distribution for each probability of tremble . We study the limit of these stationary distributions as the Ž . probability of mistake gets small keeping all other parameters fixed . The limit distribution is termed the stochastically stable distribution. The technique involved in establishing this result relies on Freidlin and Ž . Wentzell 1984 . Intuitively, with vanishing trembles the system spends virtually all of its time in absorbing sets of the learning process without trembles or equivalently the stochastically stable distribution allocates all of its probability to such sets. Transitions from one absorbing set to another can be accomplished only by means of trembles. The system will asymptotically allocate all of its probability to absorbing sets that are easy to reach and from which it is hard to get out. The proof of Proposition 2 consists in showing that it is much harder to go from the set ‫ޅ‬ of Ž . Ž . n ,n -solution clusters into the set ‫ޓ‬ of-self-confirming n , n -solution 1 2 1 2 Ž . clusters that are not in ‫ޅ‬ than the other way around.
The interpretation of Proposition 2 is thus that eventually players learn Ž . Ž . to play some n , n -solution as opposed to a self-confirming n , n -1 2 1 2 solution. It should be noted that Proposition 2 only guarantees that some Ž . Ž . n ,n -solution will emerge, but does not specify further which n , n -1 2 1 2 solution is more likely to emerge. In fact, it may well be that the stochastically stable distribution assigns a strictly positive probability only Ž . Ž . to a subset of the n , n -solution clusters as opposed to every n , n -1 2 1 2 solution cluster. Since the main purpose of this paper is to show that some Ž . n ,n -solution will emerge, we do not go into that analysis, but in 1 2 Ž . principle the n , n -solution concept could be refined on that basis. A 1 2 Ž . refined n , n -solution would be such that it is reached with a strictly 1 2 positive probability in the stochastically stable distribution. The proof of Proposition 2 requires several steps, and introducing some Ž . new notation. First, for any state g in ‫,އ‬ we let G g denote the set of states g X in ‫އ‬ such that the states of belief associated with g and g X may differ only in their assignment of the players' plausibility levels of those forecasting rules which are not the most plausible one. That is, for any g X Ž .
X in G g , player i's most plausible forecasting rule according to g coincides with player i's most plausible forecasting rule according to g, and the Ž . forecasting rules which are always confirmed by the observations throughout the play. Second, we define the notions of sequences of trembles and of isolated trembles. Ž . that leads with a strictly positi¨e probability to a n , n -solution state. The intuition for Lemma 1 is as follows. Consider a self-confirming Ž . Ž . n ,n -solution state that is not a n , n -solution state. As long as there where the most plausible forecasting rule of a player, say player 1, yields an incorrect prediction off the equilibrium path. Assume that a tremble occurs at such a time, say at period t, and yields an action with an incorrect n -length prediction according to player 1's most plausible fore-1 Ž . casting rule f . Assume also that no tremble occurs before 2 Max n , n 1 1 2 periods. From period t to period t q n y 1, the only effect on player 1 of 1 the period t tremble is to increase the plausibility levels of some forecasting rules which previously had incorrect predictions on the equilibrium Ž . path and had the prediction fitting with the tremble . It should be noted that during those periods player 1's most plausible forecasting rule remains Ž the same since the plausibility of forecasting rules having incorrect predictions on the equilibrium path prior to t can only reach the plausibil-. ity level k y n at best and k y n ) 1 . At period t q n , the period t player 1 is destabilized and may lead to any most plausible forecasting rule. Otherwise, after n other periods without trembles, the system has 1 returned to the original state of belief of player 1 except that some forecasting rules including f X have now a plausibility level that has 1 reduced by one increment. Clearly after a finite number of such isolated Ž . trembles the self-confirming n , n -solution state will be destabilized, and 1 2
Ž .
11 may lead to some n , n -solution state. It should be noted that the 1 2 same argument would not apply if the most plausible forecasting rule f 1 Ž . originated from a n , n -solution rather than from a self-confirming 1 2 Ž . n ,n -solution. The reason is that now at period t q n no forecasting 1 2 1 rule other than f would see its plausibility level decrease, as the period t 1 prediction of f would be correct.
1
The rest of the proof for Proposition 2 goes as follows. The first part of Ž . Lemma 1 shows that nonisolated or consecutive trembles are needed to Ž . destabilize a n , n -solution cluster. Proposition 2 is obtained by observ- ing that consecutive trembles are far less likely than finite sequences of Ž isolated trembles occurring at given times of the cycle induced by a Ž . . self-confirming n , n -solution . 
An Example
The aim of this subsection is to provide a simple example illustrating the learning dynamics and its convergence properties. To this end, we con-Ž . struct an example with both a self-confirming n , n -solution and a 1 2 Ž . n ,n -solution, and we show how the system is likely to go from the simplify the exposition we will assume that F consists of only two 
that of a n , n -solution the equilibrium path is DLDL . . . . We assume 1 2 prefers action L to action R given his forecast and this contradicts player . 1's forecast . Finally, we assume that players use three levels of plausibility:
Start from the global state that is most favorable to the self-confirming Ž . Ž . n ,n -solution generated by f , f . That is, the initial states of belief played by players 1 and 2, respectively, and their states of belief remain unchanged. Assume that at some period t player 1 makes a mistake and
Given that player 2's most plausible forecasting rule is f , player 2 selects 2 Ž . the action L if he does not make a mistake at period t q 1 because
That action of player 2 makes the forecast- Ž . player 1 chooses U if he does not make a mistake since f is still the 1 most plausible forecasting rule for him and L has just been played. It follows that the period t q 2 state of belief of player 2 is again s , i.e.,
In later periods t ) t, as long as there are no 2 2 2 2 mistakes the sequence of plays is ULUL . . . , and the states of belief of
The learning process involves several elements of bounded rationality Ž . in addition to the feature of limited forecasting . We wish now to discuss the role and interpretation of each assumption.
On the Finiteness of the Number of Plausibility Le¨els
The state of belief as defined in Section 4 reflects some limited capability of the players in their information treatment, where the limitation bears on two points. First the updating of the state of belief relies only on the information whether the predictions of forecasting rules f g F coini i cide with the observation or not as opposed to how many mistakes are required to explain the observation with f . Second, each player i restricts i himself to a finite number k of plausibility levels as opposed to a i Ž . potentially larger or infinite number. The first limitation is not crucial, and there would be no conceptual difficulty in making the updating depend on the number of mistakes required to explain the observation with each Ž . forecasting rule f g F . We have made it for notational purposes. The i i second limitation is more essential. Correct Bayesian updating would require a perfect record of how many mistakes are needed to explain past observations with each forecasting rule in the support of belief. Thus, for t large enough, with the standard Bayesian view, the plausibility level of some forecasting rule could go beyond k . It should be noted though that if i one accepts that player i restricts himself to k plausibility levels, the kind i Ž of updating proposed in Section 4 seems reasonable in that it is as close as . possible to the correct Bayesian updating .
Technically, the bound on the number of plausibility levels allows us to reduce the learning process to a Markov process with a finite state space. This is used to apply the techniques of perturbed Markov processes in Section 5. On an interpretative level, the bound on the number of plausibility levels seems a reasonable way to capture the idea that a boundedly rational player is likely to form his belief on the basis of some imperfect record of past observations. 12 We wish to stress that our finding Ž . that eventually players learn to play a n , n -solution is robust to any 1 2 change in the bound on the number of plausibility levels as long as k ) n q 1. 13 In this sense, the limit behavior is not too sensitive to the i i degree of bounded capability in information treatment.
On the Uniqueness of the Most Plausible Forecasting Rule
We have assumed that at each point of the process the players have a Ž uniquely defined most plausible forecasting rule which, of course, may . change from period to period . We wish to point out that the above analysis can easily be extended to the case where the players may have several most plausible forecasting rules at the same time still assuming though that when a player has several most plausible forecasting rules Ž . there is a chance which may be arbitrarily small that his state of belief Ž switches to any conceivable state of belief not necessarily one with a . uniquely defined most plausible forecasting rule . Specifically, the learning framework would then be adapted as follows: Each forecasting rule f g F ; Ž . of belief including the possibility of switch would be defined exactly in the same fashion as in Section 4. With easy adaptations of the proofs, it can be shown that the learning framework just described yields the same Ž . asymptotic results Propositions 1 and 2 as the one described above. The framework with uniquely defined most plausible forecasting rules was chosen mostly for notational purposes. 12 The limitation imposed by k in the state-of belief does not reduce to bounded recall i Ž . where the players remember only a finite number of past actions . If imperfect record were to take the form of bounded recall, then the result of Proposition 2 would only hold if the memory capacity of the players increases to infinity at the same time as the probability of Ž making a mistake goes to zero the complete argument would be significantly harder to . establish . 13 We have used that assumption to guarantee that forecasting rules which have incorrect predictions on the equilibrium path have a sufficiently high plausibility level.
On the Random De¨ice When There Are Se¨eral Most Plausible Forecasting Rules
We have assumed that whenever a player has several forecasting rules Ž which may be the most plausible one, there is a chance which may be . arbitrarily small that the player switches to any conceivable state of belief, which means that any forecasting rule may become the most plausible one. On a technical level, we have used that assumption to ensure that the only absorbing sets of the process without mistakes are the self-confirming Ž . Ž n ,n -solution clusters. Otherwise, it would a priori be conceivable that 1 2 the process without mistakes admit other absorbing sets in which the most . plausible forecasting rule of a player varies in a cyclical fashion, say. Ž Whether that assumption is needed for Proposition 2 is an open and . Ž presumably difficult question left for future research. Note that in the example, we would obtain the same conclusion if the assumption were to . be dropped because there are only two forecasting rules.
The random device assumption can again be interpreted in terms of bounded rationality, and it should be noted that the convergence result to Ž . n ,n -solutions does not depend on the exact specification of the distri- Given that player i's learning bears on forecasting rules, player i may be thought of as being mostly concerned with the determination of the most plausible forecasting rule. When there is exactly one most plausible forecasting rule, player i is satisfied. When there are two or more forecast-Ž ing rules that can be the most plausible one, player i is unhappy or feels . that something is wrong with his belief and must change something. It seems then reasonable to model that change as a switch to any conceivable Ž state of belief where the switch is assumed not to be fully under the . 14, 15 control of the player .
14 There are other ways to model the disenchantment of player i. For example, when the previous most plausible forecasting rule becomes as likely as some other forecasting rule, then the previous most plausible forecasting rule may be assigned to the set of least plausible forecasting rules with positive probability. Such a specification would yield the same asymp-Ž . totic results with a slightly more complicated proof . 15 Another interpretation of the state of belief perturbation is that the player misperceives with positive probability the plausibility levels of the forecasting rules other than the most plausible one, and therefore when there are several most plausible forecasting rules the state of belief may switch to any conceivable state. In establishing Proposition 2, that interpretation would, however, require that the probability of misperception goes to zero together with the probability of trembling, which would complicate the argument.
On the Mistakes
In the learning process we have assumed that each player i could make a mistake at each period where he must move. Also, the distribution of mistakes was assumed to be independent from period to period and stationary. Given the analysis of Section 5 it should be clear that the feature of the mistake distribution that drives the convergence result is Ž that consecutive trembles are far less likely than isolated ones in the . sense made precise in Definition 8 . This is because isolated trembles are Ž . Ž sufficient to destabilize a self-confirming n , n -solution that is not a 1 2 Ž . . n ,n -solution cluster, whereas consecutive trembles are required to 1 2 Ž . destabilize a n , n -solution cluster. The asymptotic result of Section 5 1 2 would thus continue to hold as long as that property is met whether or not the distributions of mistakes are assumed to be stationary and independent Ž from period to period on state-dependent perturbations, see also Bergin . and Lipman, 1996 .
On the Forecasting Rule
Throughout the paper, each player i was assumed to make his choice of Ž action on the basis of his forecast over the forthcoming n moves includi . ing his own moves . In some cases, the forecast can be thought of as bearing only on the reaction function of the other player over the forthcoming n moves. In such cases, one might argue that player i makes a i plan of actions over the forthcoming n moves given his forecast about the i reaction function of the other player. His plan of actions leads him in turn to choose a current action, which is the effective choice to be made in the current period. At every period where player i must move, player i would then make plans of actions over the forthcoming n periods yielding a i choice of current action. For such a process of thought, it may well be that his effective choices of action in the next periods do not coincide with the plan originally made even though player i has a correct forecast about the reaction function of the other player. In other words, this process of thought might lead to time inconsistencies. In the long run, if player i learns the reaction function of the other player he should realize that his plans of actions do not coincide with the actions he effectively chose in the next periods. The only way for player i to avoid time inconsistencies is to reduce his current period choice to his current period action. The formulation adopted in this paper is the only one compatible with that view.
CONCLUSION
A learning process was proposed in which players eventually learn to Ž . play a n , n -solution. The process involved several elements of bounded 1 2 rationality including some which are not linked to the limited forecasting Ž . form of bounded rationality. Still, as suggested in the discussion Section 6 Ž . the convergence to n , n -solution is robust to a number of variations of 1 2 how the other sorts of bounded rationality are modelled as long as the players are assumed to keep the same length of foresight throughout the process. A possible extension would allow player i to change his length of foresight when he feels that he understands sufficiently well the forthcom-Ž . ing n moves as a function of his own move. He might then potentially i decide to increase his length of foresight from n to n q 1, say. In this i i Ž . view, starting from the n , n -solution that is currently played, player i 1 2 might infer from the observed sequence of forthcoming n q 1 actions new i Ž . n q1 -length forecasts. In the case this induces a modification of his i Ž . behavior, a second stage of learning would lead to some n q 1, n -
Otherwise, the original n , n -solution was already a n q 1 2 i . 1, n -solution. Such a process of changes of lengths of foresight might be j pursued for both players defining a new stochastic process. If there exist Ž . Ž . strategy profiles that define a n , n -solution for all n , n sufficiently 1 2 1 2 Ž large such strategy profiles are termed hyperstable solutions in Jehiel, . 1995 , then these are absorbing states of the overall process, and one might conjecture that they will emerge in the long run. The precise analysis is left for future research.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. It is rather immediate to check that sets in Ž . ‫ޓ‪j‬ޅ‬ are absorbing. To see this consider a self-confirming n , n -solu-1 2 tion state, and observe that when there are no trembles the played actions Ž . always confirm the prediction of the self-confirming n , n -solution fore-1 2 Ž . casting rule. As a result the self-confirming n , n -solution forecasting 1 2 rule remains the most plausible forecasting rule all along the played path Moreover, those forecasting rules which give the correct predictions along the played path keep the same plausibility level and those which give some incorrect predictions have a plausibility level set to k .
i Conversely, consider an absorbing set. We wish to show that it is Ž . necessarily a self-confirming n , n -solution cluster. If the same forecast-1 2 ing rule remains the most plausible one for each player i all along the learning process generated by a state in the absorbing set, then it is rather straightforward to see that the absorbing set must be a self-confirming 16 It might as well be argued that, when a player feels that he understands sufficiently well the sequence of forthcoming actions, he decides to be less sophisticated and reduces his length of foresight by one increment, say. As long as the length of foresight remains above the threshold defined by the hyperstable solution the play is unaffected.
Ž . n ,n -solution cluster. If the most plausible forecasting rule does change 1 2 for at least one player, say player 1, along the learning process generated by some state in the absorbing set, then it must be that the random device in the updating process of player 1's state of belief is triggered at some points in time. Consider such a period t. There is a positive probability that the next state of belief of player 1 corresponds to that of a self-con-Ž . firming n , n -solution state. If player 2's state of belief corresponds to 1 2 Ž . that same self-confirming n , n -solution state, then the Markov process 1 2 Ž . has reached a self-confirming n , n -solution cluster which is absorbing.
1 2
It will thus never return to the original absorbing set, yielding a contradiction. If player 2's state of belief does not correspond to that self-confirming Ž . Ž . n ,n -solution state, then eventually after a finite number of periods 1 2 some forecasting rule of player 2 other than the most plausible at period t will become equally plausible. At such a time the random device of the updating of player 2 will be triggered and there is a positive probability that player 2's new state of belief now corresponds to the self-confirming Ž .
17 n , n -solution state. From then on, the system will never leave the 1 2 Ž . associated self-confirming n , n -solution cluster, and therefore will never 1 2 return to the original absorbing set, a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Ž . Ž . Proof of Lemma 1. 1 Consider a n , n -solution state. Assume 1 2 player 1 makes a mistake at period t, and that there is no further tremble Ž . up to period t q 2 Max n , n . We first analyze the effect of such a 1 2 tremble on player 1's state of belief. Compared to the description in the main text, the only difference is that, at period t q n , the current most 1 plausible forecasting rule of player 1 yields a correct prediction, and therefore the updating can only reinforce player 1's belief in his most Ž plausible forecasting rule the plausibility level of those forecasting rules which yielded incorrect predictions after the period t tremble will increase . Ž . by one increment if possible . Regarding the effect of player 1's tremble on player 2, we note that it is only temporary and after 2 n periods, player 2 2's state of belief returns to his original period t state of belief. Clearly, the argument shows that infinite sequences of isolated trembles are unable Ž . to destabilize a n , n -solution cluster. plausible forecasting rule of a player, say player 1, yields an incorrect prediction off the equilibrium path. Assume that a tremble occurs at such a time, say at period t, and yields an action with an incorrect n -length 1 17 If in the meantime the random device of player 1 is triggered there is always a positive Ž . probability that he returns always to the same self-confirming n , n -solution state of belief.
1 2 Ž Ž . . prediction with no tremble before 2 Max n , n periods . The effect on Ž goes to zero a finite sequence of isolated trembles occurring at given . times of a cycle of finite length is infinitely more likely than consecutive Ž trembles over a number T f Nr of periods where N s k q k y 2 is 1 2 the maximum number of isolated trembles required to destabilize a Ž . . self-confirming n , n -solution state, see above . The reason is that, over 1 2
TsNr periods, the expected number of trembles is N, and as goes to zero the probability that there be consecutive trembles becomes negligible as opposed to the probability of having N isolated trembles destabilizing Ž . some given self-confirming n , n -solution state. Q.E.D. 1 2
